Special operations and cyber warfare by Tebedo, Jason C.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection
2016-12
Special operations and cyber warfare
Tebedo, Jason C.







Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND CYBER WARFARE 
by 
Jason C. Tebedo 
December 2016 
Thesis Advisor: Dorothy Denning 
Second Reader: Duane Davis 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704–0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND CYBER WARFARE 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Jason C. Tebedo
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School 










11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
As the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) prepares for future conflicts, some 
have questioned its ability to conduct Special Warfare and Surgical Strike in all domains of warfare, to 
include the cyber domain. This thesis examines the applicability of cyber operations to U.S. special 
operations and whether the cyber support provided by the United States Cyber Command 
(USCYBERCOM) is sufficient to meet USSOCOM’s potential cyber requirements. It explores 
USSOCOM’s congressionally mandated core activities and how cyber operations could promote such 
activities. Finally, the thesis provides a decision theory and operational design analysis of how USSOCOM 
could build its own internal cyber capability - if USSOCOM determines USCYBERCOM cannot meet the 
cyber requirements of the special operations community. 
The researcher was unable to conclude as to whether USCYBERCOM’s cyber support to USSOCOM 
was sufficient. USCYBERCOM’s cyber support structure is still too immature for analysis and therefore 
necessitates future research by USSOCOM. The thesis does conclude USSOCOM can improve their 
special operation’s efficacy by incorporating the cyber domain. Finally, the research concludes, 
if USSOCOM were to build a cyber capacity, the reflagging of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade would be 
the best course of action.  
14. SUBJECT TERMS
cyber domain, cyber warfare, special operations, core activities, Special Warfare, Surgical 
Strike, future warfare, technology, low intensity conflict, Internet, networks, non-state actors, 





















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
  
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND CYBER WARFARE 
 
 
Jason C. Tebedo 
Major, United States Army 
B.S., Western Michigan University, 2004 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 





















Dr. John Arquilla 
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
ABSTRACT 
As the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) prepares for 
future conflicts, some have questioned its ability to conduct Special Warfare and Surgical 
Strike in all domains of warfare, to include the cyber domain. This thesis examines the 
applicability of cyber operations to U.S. special operations and whether the cyber support 
provided by the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) is sufficient to meet 
USSOCOM’s potential cyber requirements. It explores USSOCOM’s congressionally 
mandated core activities and how cyber operations could promote such activities. Finally, 
the thesis provides a decision theory and operational design analysis of how USSOCOM 
could build its own internal cyber capability - if USSOCOM determines USCYBERCOM 
cannot meet the cyber requirements of the special operations community. 
The researcher was unable to conclude as to whether USCYBERCOM’s cyber 
support to USSOCOM was sufficient. USCYBERCOM’s cyber support structure is still 
too immature for analysis and therefore necessitates future research by USSOCOM. The 
thesis does conclude USSOCOM can improve their special operation’s efficacy 
by incorporating the cyber domain. Finally, the research concludes, if USSOCOM were 
to build a cyber capacity, the reflagging of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade would be the 
best course of action.  
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Special Operations Forces (SOF) generally are described as close-knit, 
specifically structured units staffed through a judicious screening and selection process 
for missions that either require a high degree of technical expertise or are politically 
sensitive in nature. SOF uses adaptive tools and accomplishes the goals and objectives of 
the nation through the use of irregular warfare and the employment of unconventional 
tactics against strategic and operational objectives. The modern battlefield juxtaposed 
with the United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) intent to 
synchronize the SOF Operations and provide SOF to Geographic Combatant Commands 
(GCC), generates an interesting question. If USSOCOM is charged with providing SOF 
support to the GCCs but is unable to provide adequate unconventional/irregular effects in 
all domains of warfare (specifically in the cyber domain), does it still fulfill its assigned 
charter to the GCCs.	
A. RESEARCH QUESTION(S) 
1. Main Question 
This thesis centers on examining the overall question: is USSOCOM’s posture for 
cyber operations effective for the current and future operating environment?  
2. Sub-question One 
Following the debate surrounding USSOCOM’s application of the cyber domain 
and counterterrorism activities, the researcher will analyze USSOCOM’s missions, 
Surgical Strike and Special Warfare. The mission analysis will be conducted to address 
an operational query as to whether core elements of USSOCOM’s counterterrorism 
operations are sufficient as is or whether there is room for improvement through the 
incorporation of cyber operations. 
2 
3. Sub-question Two 
As currently designed, USSOCOM does not have its own cyber organization and 
instead relies on cyber support from USCYBERCOM. USCYBERCOM provides cyber 
support teams to augment USSOCOM’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) global mission 
requirements. The question explored here is whether this arrangement meets 
USSOCOM’s requirement or if USSOCOM needs its own internal cyber force. If the 
latter, how could USSOCOM build such a unit? 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
1. Purpose 
Defining purpose within the research, the research is designed to address how 
USSOCOM can best incorporate cyberwarfare into its operations.  
2. Rationale for Study 
The rationale for the study is that cyberspace is a warfighting domain that 
USSOCOM needs to operate in effectively along with the other domains. Unlike similar 
domains, like the Air and Space Domains, the Cyber Domain is not as easily incorporated 
into USSOCOM’s unique mission set. USSOCOM’s incorporation of cyber effects, as 
discussed below, requires immense coordination, confidentiality, and extreme attention to 
detail—all of which are difficult to achieve from an outside perspective 
Cyber operations enhance traditional military activities and are becoming a 
critical engagement strategy for state and non-state actors. The evolution of traditional 
military activities creates a question with regard to USSOCOM’s approach to modern 
warfare. Is USSOCOM’s current “supported model” sufficient or does it need its own 
internal cyber unit? Current cyber support operations draw parallels to the inter-
organizational Close Air Support (CAS) provided to special operations forces in the early 
stages of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. In contrast, an internal cyber component 
may best fit the unit’s operational needs as did the need to create a SOF specific (internal) 
aviation regiment 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR).  
3 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The researcher will utilize an empirical-analytical approach that draws on existing 
literature, operational art, and decision theory. The research examines current and historic 
literature pertaining to the mission, doctrine, organization, manpower, and resources of 
USCYBERCOM and USSOCOM. Specifically, the literature referenced will be used to 
analyze existing SOF and cyber theory that concerns the unique mission of USSOCOM 
and the current cyber support structure provided by USCYBERCOM. Current literature 
surrounding Special Operation’s missions and operational requirements will be examined 
for the purpose of analyzing whether USCYBERCOM can meet USSOCOM’s mission 
requirements or whether USSOCOM needs its own cyber component. Although the result 
of this analysis is inconclusive, the thesis will apply operational art, specifically 
operational design, to determine how best to organize an internal cyber capability within 
USSOCOM, should that strategy be deemed preferable at some time in the future. For the 
purpose of identifying the most effective strategy for a potential cyber component within 
USSOCOM, the researcher will utilize quantifiable decision theory. Specific focus is 
placed on where the cyber billets would come from, in particular, whether they would be 
new authorizations or acquired by reflagging an existing unit of USSOCOM. 
D. THESIS STRUCTURE 
Chapter II examines mission and core capabilities of USSOCOM to determine the 
role of cyber operations in USSOCOM. Chapter III examines the current state of 
USCYBERCOM, and how it supports USSOCOM. It then identifies and analyzes nine 
criteria for assessing whether USSCOCOM’s cyber operations are best served by the 
current arrangement where cyber forces are supplied by USCYBERCOM or by 
USSOCOM building its own cyber component. Finally, Chapter IV applies operational 
art and decision theory to determine the best approach for building a cyber capability 
within USSOCOM if that strategy is pursued. 
4 
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II. APPLICATION OF CYBER OPERATIONS TO 
USSOCOM’S MISSION 
The private, public and commercial sector are now subject to a new world order 
whereas the dangers of online operations are now more progressively complex. In 
response to this complex threat, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Unified Campaign 
Plan (UCP) assigned “USSOCOM the responsibility for synchronizing DOD plans 
against global terrorist networks and, as directed, conducting global operations against 
those networks.”1 USSOCOM is chartered under Title 10 to operate as a “global SOF 
provider with the inherent responsibility to coordinate global SOF operations with the 
Services, Combatant Commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD).”2 
Taking a step back and analyzing USSOCOM, few would take the position that 
USSOCOM’s operators are untrained, ill equipped, and unprepared to fight terrorist 
networks. However, the operational planning and execution against terrorist networks 
requires the incorporation of all domains of warfare, especially the cyber domain. A 
debate remains as to whether USSOCOM is prepared to address cyber special operations 
as part of worldwide counterterrorism requirements. 
A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND CYBER 
Although the formal integration of cyber operations into special operations is 
currently debated among scholars, politicians, and military leaders (as described in 
subsequent writings), the 21st century revolution in cyber warfare necessitates that the 
United States Government (USG) conduct further review of the applicability of full cyber 
SOF integration. As a reference to the global cyber/defense revolution, other nations have 
                                                 
1 Andrew Feickert, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress (CRS 
Report No. RS21048) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 2, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf 
2 Ibid., 7. 
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already combined special operations and cyber warfare with overwhelmingly positive 
effects.3 Elite special operations units from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, known as Quds 
Force,” reportedly used similar tactics online to identify and take out ringleaders of the 
failed “Green Revolution to overthrow then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 
2009.”4 Though early in the concept of cyber warfare and special operations, Iran was 
progressive in thinking when they later integrated a civilian cyber force—a part of Quds 
Force units. This hybrid SOF/civilian cyber force was utilized under the same cyber 
warfare methodology when addressing insurgent opposition leaders fighting to overthrow 
Syrian President Bashar Assad.5 
In the Eastern Theater, Russian SOF outsourced the help from civilian cyber 
actors and criminal cyber organizations to conduct operations in the Ukraine and Crimea. 
The combination of cyber and SOF allowed Moscow the opportunity to gain territory 
(Crimea) without ever conducting phase three operations.6 The examples incorporating 
cyber operations into hybrid/irregular warfare tactics by Iran and Russia provided above 
outline a potential road for other U.S. adversaries to follow.7 
B. USSOCOM’S REQUIREMENTS 
As an overview of USSOCOM and its congressionally mandated mission, 
USSOCOM defines its mission along two macro and twelve micro operational lines. The 
two lines defined at the macro level are Surgical Strike and Special Warfare, while the 
twelve at the micro level are defined as core activities. These lines of effort allow the 
                                                 
3Carlo Munoz, “Do Special Operations Forces Need Their Own Elite Cyberwarfare Team?” The Daily 
Dot. January 19, 2016. Accessed May 05, 2016. http://www.dailydot.com/opinion/special-operations-elite-
cyberwarfare-team/; Patrick Duggan, “Man, Computer, and Special Warfare,” Small Wars Journal (January 
2016), accessed December 14, 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/man-computer-and-special-
warfare. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Carlo Munoz, “Do Special Operations Forces Need Their Own Elite Cyberwarfare Team?” The 





command to synchronize its operations in support of oversees contingency operations 
against transnational terrorist organizations while ensuring unity of effort within the 
command. Without a defined role at the micro and macro levels, USSOCOM would not 
be able to properly lobby for resources in support of worldwide operations. 
1. Special Warfare 
Special Warfare is commonly characterized as Unconventional Warfare, 
Psychological Warfare, and/or Political Warfare. According to the Joint Publication (JP) 
3–05, Special Warfare is, 
The execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and 
nonlethal actions taken by specially trained and educated forces that have 
a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in 
small unit tactics, subversion, sabotage and the ability to build and fight 
alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain or 
hostile environment.8 
Special Warfare operators preserve expertise in specialized low-level maneuvers; 
they train in conjunction with indigenous proxy organizations in a permissive, inexact, or 
aggressive environment.9 Special Warfare operations are coined white SOF because they 
are typically those missions that are sensitive in nature but are not necessarily what the 
media would define as high profile or high risk. 
2. Surgical Strike 
In contrast, black SOF or Surgical Strike, typically involves lethal operations. 
Surgical Strike is defined in Joint Publication 3–05 as, 
The execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special 
operations forces in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments 
                                                 
8 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special Operations. Joint Publication 3-05. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, April 18, 2010. 
9 David S. Maxwell, “Thoughts on the Future of Special Operations” Small Wars Journal (October 31, 
2013), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thoughts-on-the-future-of-special-operations. 
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to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or 
influence threats.10  
Figure 1, provided by the United States Army Special Operations Command 
(USASOC), highlights how the micro and macro levels of effort merge to create 
synergistic effects. 
 
Figure 1.  Army SOF Surgical Strike and Special Warfare.11 
3. USSOCOM’s Core Activities 
At the micro level, the Department of Defense directs USSOCOM to organize, 
train, and equip in preparation for Surgical Strike and Special Warfare mission. The 
Surgical Strike activities (direct) conducted by USSOCOM are Direct Action (DA), 
Special Reconnaissance (SR), Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), and 
                                                 
10 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-05, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, April 18, 2010. 
11 U.S. Department of the Army, ARSOF Operating Concept 2022 U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, September 30, 2015. 
9 
Counterterrorism (CT), while the Special Warfare activities (indirect) are Unconventional 
Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Force Assistance (SFA), 
Hostage Rescue and Recovery (HRR), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Foreign Humanitarian 
Aid (FHA), Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and Civil Affairs 
Operations (CAO).12 Each core activity is presented within Figure 2. The figured showed 
which unit is responsible, whether it is an indirect or direct approach, and an example of 
its application. 
 
Figure 2.  USSOCOM’s Core Activities.13 
C. CYBER SURGICAL STRIKE (CORE ACTIVITIES) 
1. Direct Action 
Joint Publication 3–05 defines the core activity “Direct Action (DA) as, short-
duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation 
                                                 
12 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-05, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, April 18, 2010. 
13 Steve Bucci, “The Importance of Special Operations Forces Today and Going Forward,” The 
Heritage Foundation. Accessed May 4, 2016. http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/important-essays-
analysis/importance-special-operations-forces-today-going-forward/. 
10 
in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments and which employ specialized 
military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated 
targets.”14 Aside from the very kinetic engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, as a whole 
DA engagements only account for a fraction of total SOF mission load. A possible reason 
for the public association of SOF and DA is the large media factor associated with these 
operations. The killing of high profile targets, such as Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and 
Usama Bin Laden as well as movies and video games are prime instigators of this public 
perception. 
With regard to DA and the cyber domain, Colonel Duggan, cyberwarfare scholar, 
generally believes the core philosophy supporting all cyber special operations is around 
the idea of promoting cyber technology’s asymmetry to strengthen the rudimentary 
characteristics of DA missions.15 If appropriately utilized, cyber knowhow can intensify a 
DA mission.16 As with other core activities, cyber warfare in itself is not an effective 
method of employment. Cyber effects are best used in combination with elements of the 
other domains.  
The big question posed is, of all the United States Government (USG) 
organizations, which organization is more seasoned to engage in DA missions than SOF 
who have been conducting this brand of warfare against insurgent groups for the past 
three decades?17 Highlighting an ongoing real-world cyber DA mission, the lesser-known 
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) already mentors foreign DA groups in Iraq 
and Syria and is organizationally responsible for killing members of the Islamic State’s 
(ISIS) cyber caliphate - including Siful Haque Sujan, suspected English-born hacker who 
                                                 
14 “Joint Publication 3-05, Joint Special Operations.” Apr 2011. Council on Foreign Relations. Dec 
2016, X. 
15 Patrick Duggan, “Man, Computer, and Special Warfare,” Small Wars Journal (January 4, 2016), 
accessed December 14, 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/man-computer-and-special-warfare. 
16 Ibid. 
17Carlo Munoz.,“Do Special Operations Forces Need Their Own Elite Cyberwarfare Team?” The 
Daily Dot. January 19, 2016. Accessed May 05, 2016. http://www.dailydot.com/opinion/special-
operations-elite-cyberwarfare-team/. 
11 
was recognized as a top Islamic State facilitator of online operations.18 Though the 
process of killing or injuring an enemy combatant will nearly always necessitate the use 
of kinetic weaponry, in the near term future, an attacker may be able to utilize the cyber 
domain for DA attacks. Employing malware that can cause a computer’s battery to 
explode or quite possibly attacking a vulnerable system such as a Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition (SCADA), as represented through the Aurora Experiment, are 
potential applications of DA Cyber.19 Other examples include disabling adversary 
security systems and alarms, and disabling adversary communications to support a raid. 
2. Special Reconnaissance 
The core activity Special Reconnaissance (SR) is defined under Joint Publication 
3–05 as, “reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in 
hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or 
verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities 
not normally found in conventional forces.”20 To give reference, SR in regards to nation 
states relates to the communal term espionage. The most common form of the core SR 
activity in the DOD is Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE). 
Cyber weapons have multiple functions and can be used for espionage or OPE. It 
is important to highlight the similarities between the intelligence world, espionage, and 
special operations SR. The domains of cyber-centric SR and traditional 
intelligence/espionage both involve hacking or breaking into a state’s logical/human 
network and will mostly likely utilize the same methods and technology to do so.21 
Edward Lucas, author of Cyberphobia: Identity, Trust, Security and the Internet, 
                                                 
18 Carlo Munoz, “Do Special Operations Forces Need Their Own Elite Cyberwarfare Team?” The 
Daily Dot. January 19, 2016. Accessed May 05, 2016. http://www.dailydot.com/opinion/special-
operations-elite-cyberwarfare-team/. 
19 Scott D Applegate, “The Dawn of Kinetic Cyber,” In Cyber Conflict (CyCon), 2013 5th 
International Conference on, pp. 1–15. IEEE, 2013. 
20 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-05. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, April 18, 2010. 
21 Edward Lucas, Cyberphobia: Identity, Trust, Security and the Internet (London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2015), Chapter 8. 
12 
observes that there is a strong real-life close relationship between the spy domain amid 
intelligence collection (finding things out) and special operations (direct action). A prime 
example of this is the killing of Usama Bin Laden. The Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) was responsible for collecting the intelligence, but it was the DOD that conducted 
the physical operation.  
Developing a capacity to conduct cyber SR, and its subordinate OPE, may 
economize USSOCOM’s manpower, resources, and time. Cyber reconnaissance and 
intelligence gathering is infinitely easier than the routine methods of espionage, as seen 
during the Cold War.22 It is difficult to overstate the extreme exertion of resources to 
recruit a dependable agent and put such an agent into the precise place in an organization 
so that he or she can duplicate and extract a significant quantity of valued material.23 The 
ability to infiltrate an open and unsecure network would cost pennies on the dollar in 
comparison to the extensive resources involved with human intelligence. Expanding on 
this point, potential inexpensive applications of cyber SR could include exploiting a 
terrorist’s computer or cell phone to turn on a web-camera and microphone. 
Cyber SR may also prove useful for attributing adversary cyber operations. As 
pointed out in the 2015 Special Operations Manual published by USSOCOM, the 
advances in cyber technology may allow USSOCOM the ability to uncover cyber 
attribution, which terrorist networks typically conceal.24 While malicious cyber actors 
can penetrate or interrupt targeted cyber networks, most terrorist networks can no longer 
accept that these cyber undertakings will continue unnoticed.25 These networks now must 
assume their personal identities will at some point be revealed. To date, USSOCOM has 
made noteworthy developments in identifying and attributing cyber infringements.26  
                                                 
22 Richard A Clarke, and Robert K. Knake. Cyber war. HarperCollins, 2011, Kindle 3281–3283. 
23 Ibid. 
24 “Special Operations Forces Reference Manual,” Federation of American Scientist, June 2015, 
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3. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) is defined in JP 3–05 as, 
“USG activities that are conducted to ensure the U.S. and its Armed Forces, allies, 
partners, and interests are neither coerced nor attacked with WMD.”27 As far as 
USSOCOM is concerned, the “primary role of SOF for CWMD is preventing WMD 
development, proliferation, and use.”28 Presidential Decision Directive 39 provides the 
legal basis for the DOD and, ultimately, USSOCOM to respond to threats of WMD. 
In the February 2012 Worldwide Threat Assessment brief to Congress, James 
Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, emphasized the importance of cyber 
operations as he identified cyber as the third major hazard facing the U.S., after 
“terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”29 Everyday cyber 
capabilities and terrorist networks continue to grow while nuclear powers, such as Russia, 
Pakistan, and North Korea become weaker. Ruling out the possibility of a terrorist 
network acquiring nuclear material and utilizing the cyber domain to facilitate operations 
could be a strategic misstep for the United States and its partners. 
STUXNET, a piece of malware designed to destroy nuclear centrifuges in Iran, is 
a prime example of cyber CWMD operations. The New York Times reported that 
STUXNET was designed “to mess with Iran’s best scientific minds” and “make them feel 
they were stupid.”30 Whether it made them feel stupid or incapable of developing a 
nuclear weapon, there is no doubt the attack set the program back to the tune of 6 months 
to 2 years. This interruption, however, provided legislators “both the time and diplomatic 
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breathing room to assess Iran’s true intentions and design an appropriate response to its 
potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.”31  
Cyber CWMD operations, similar to cyber SR, also seem to leverage economy of 
manpower and resources. The (STUXNET) malware most likely impaired Iran’s nuclear 
making capabilities as much as a DA attack by Israel would have.32 If the same effects in 
cyberspace are achieved without putting boots on the ground, planes in the air or causing 
civilian casualties, then further use of cyber weapon systems requires strong 
consideration. 
As a counterpoint, the broader costs of relying only on the cyber domain require 
further analysis. SOF have always placed a strong focus on the human domain, and 
without putting boots on the ground, this element may be lost. Only so much access can 
be garnered from afar. At some point, the implementation of human intelligence and 
technical implantation of cyber technologies may necessitate boots on the ground. For 
instance, with STUXNET, the Iranian nuclear facility was air gapped from the open 
network. If someone was not physically available to inject malicious code via a USB 
drive into the SCADA system, the STUXNET program may have not succeeded. 
4. Counterterrorism and Hostage Rescue and Recovery 
Counterterrorism (CT) is defined in JP 3–05 as, “activities and operations taken to 
neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them 
incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve 
their goals.”33 The joint publication also defines “Hostage Rescue and Recovery (HRR) 
as a personnel recovery method used to recover isolated personnel who are specifically 
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designated as hostages.”34 Because the other supporting core activities feed into 
CT/HRR, their application to the cyber domain as discussed below also supports 
CT/HRR. 
D. SPECIAL WARFARE CORE ACTIVITIES 
1. Counterinsurgency 
The Department of Defense defines counterinsurgency (COIN) as 
“comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and 
contain insurgency and address its root causes.”35 Though COIN falls within the Special 
Warfare umbrella it can also fall under Surgical Strike. The COIN example of surgical 
strike may include DA. COIN is the current focus for military operations in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and other areas of insurgent activity. Special Warfare at its root is deeply 
ingrained in COIN, and vary rarely do COIN operations necessitate the application of 
Surgical Strike. 
 Applying cyber operations to COIN and Special Warfare, SOF could 
remotely, via the Internet, train indigenous populations on how to employ Unmanned 
Arial Vehicles (UAV’s) to observe, engage, and disband gatherings as part of cyber-
enhanced populace control measures.36 Cyber COIN could also instruct populations on 
how to construct crowdsourced, geo-tagged, and non-standard databases for potential 
population centric operations.37 These operations can be used to gradually damage the 
opposition’s quality of life through cyber centric targeted operations and “tactics rather 
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than quick, high profile battles with decisive results.”38 Cyber COIN operations also form 
an umbrella to the more technical core activities, such as UW and MISO.  
2. Unconventional Warfare 
Unconventional Warfare is defined in JP 3–05 as, activities conducted to enable a 
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or 
occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla 
force in a denied area.”39 Special Forces mission and functions are organically derived 
from Unconventional Warfare. UW is the standard method to averting future significant 
military conflicts. USSOCOM’s core activity, Unconventional Warfare (UW), is built on 
the foundation of other core activities working by, through, and with indigenous or 
surrogate forces to overthrow an occupying or government force.”40 
COL Duggan theorizes that the application of cyber UW appears to be limitless. 
Centered on the idea of resistance movements, Special Operators could utilize 3-D 
printing technology to manufacture equipment and repair parts for resistance groups’ 
guerillas and members of their underground support networks.41 Cyber UW operations 
could empower resistance groups through 3-D technology by manufacturing computers, 
weapons, munitions, engines, UAVs, and IEDs.42 Other applications of cyber UW may 
include the utilization of human, informational, physical, and intelligence networks to 
target an occupying force’s logical and physical computer network.43 Similar to the use 
of precision guided technology, the suite of cyber tools available can target precise 
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elements of an information network while minimizing collateral damage.44 Realizing the 
unlimited potential of UW operations, cyber UW can work with the private sector to 
improve a tactic domestically while simultaneously denying an adaptive adversary a 
“technological advantage through counter UW constructs.”45 
Unfortunately, UW is not always a palatable concept with interagency partners 
and embassy staffs because of the mission to overthrow an occupying force, but the idea 
of cyber enabled UW may alleviate undue stress. Conceptually, cyber UW builds 
“human, physical, intelligence, and information infrastructures on social media platforms 
with cyber tools and advanced techniques without putting boots on the ground.”46 The 
theory is collection from afar, which allows USSOCOM the ability to conduct core 
activity while all parties within the USG maintain the ability to monitor operations. Small 
technological inputs, as these not only build trust within the interagency, but they may 
also set the conditions for operations in other theaters of conflict. 
3. Foreign Internal Defense
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is defined as the “participation by civilian and 
military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another 
government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from 
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”47 FID 
operations typically occur in a peacetime environment and commonly are Joint 
Capability Exchange Training (JCET) exercises. The aim is to empower “HN forces to 
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Similar to cyber UW, cyber-enabled FID is a cheap and low-cost program that can 
empower indigenous populations through minimal technology and most importantly 
minimal loss of life.49 From operations, such as conducting virtual reality weapons 
training, to providing real-time guidance through virtual uplinks, as with UW, the 
applications of cyber technology are limitless. In areas of low or no connectivity, the 
distribution of low-cost operating systems and devices, such as the Raspberry Pi, could 
facilitate “a wide-array of communication, command, and control, as well as mapping 
functions.”50 Virtual reality technology could also enable the inclusion of robotic 
technology to assist in the training and ultimate employment of host nation forces.  
4. Security Force Assistance 
The Department of Defense’s National Strategy for Cyberspace’s centrally 
highlights building (cyber) partner capacity in key regions.”51 The task of Building 
Partner Capacity (BPC) or more appropriately termed “Security Force Assistance (SFA) 
is defined as the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the 
U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign 
security forces and their supporting institutions.”52 The DOD’s Cyber Strategy states, 
“The Defense Department will work regularly with other agencies of the U.S. 
Government, to include the Department of State, in building partner capacity.”53 
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The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 designates54 the Department of State (DOS) 
as the primary director of SFA and the DOD in support. As currently delegated within the 
DOD, SFA is sponsored by the Department of the Army and USSOCOM.55 As Harry 
Yarger, military scholar and author of Building Partner Capacity, commented on the 
importance of SOF in a BPC (SFA) strategy, “Special Operations Forces (SOF) are 
instrumental components in the pursuit of a successful BPC policy.”56 Though SOF are 
not experts in cyber SFA nor do they have an exemption to Public Law 87–195, they do 
have a unique position within a large number of embassy country teams. SOF are 
embedded in multiple embassies across the world as Military Liaison Elements (MLE) 
that are designed to work side-by-side with country teams to achieve a unified approach 
to shaping operations. This unique position may serve as an advantage point when the 
DOD attempts to implement a cyber SFA strategy. 
5. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) is defined by the DOD as, “ the activities 
conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human 
suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.”57 FHA is a cornerstone activity that builds trust 
with partner nations and highlights the fluidity and adaptability of USSOCOM. Whether 
responding to the earthquake in Haiti or a typhoon in the Philippines, FHA operations are 
important not only to national security but also to the preservation of human life. 
Unfortunately, one of the biggest issues when conducting FHA operations is 
quick and simple collaboration. The problem is that the Department of Defense 
Information Network (DODIN) is not available for outside organizations. Another issue 
is that the classification levels of Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret, weigh too heavily 
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on the concept of secrecy, which ultimately hinder network availability. Without the 
ability to communicate across all organizations, FHA operations may falsely identify 
USSOCOM as a secretive organization with a clandestine objective. 
Though USSOCOM is not tasked to directly address FHA connectivity issues, the 
rapid response capability of USSOCOM typically means they are first boots on the 
ground and therefore should be prepared. To address this cyber capability gap, 
USSOCOM, in times of crises, could build an ad-hoc civilian network that promotes 
collaboration and availability. This quick response cyber unit could hastily set up a 
network that allows all parties to communicate on an open and dynamic basis while 
protecting confidential information. USSOCOM could develop a rapidly deployable unit 
composed of network experts who are capable of immediately building and supporting a 
multi-stakeholder network. To remove the outside perception of military bias, network 
operations could immediately include non-governmental organizations and host nation 
stakeholders.  
6. Military Information Support Operations 
Military Information Support Operations (MISO)/Psychological Operations 
(PSYOP) are defined in JP 3–05 as “the planned operations to convey selected 
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, 
objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, 
groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives.”58 “The 
purpose of MISO is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the 
joint force commander’s objectives.”59 “USSOCOM is assigned to develop Military 
Information Support Operations (MISO) capabilities in support of the Joint Staff’s 
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information operations (IO) responsibilities and provide support to combatant 
commanders for theater MISO planning and execution.”60 
Cyber operations can “leverage sympathetic privateers and vigilantes, as well as 
employ false flag efforts to create believable deceptions in cyberspace” over a prolonged 
period.61 These operations, all conducted from afar, provide an opportunity for 
USSOCOM to conduct Special Warfare without ever putting boots on the ground. SOF 
provides access to and the ability to influence populations where conventional U.S. force 
presence is not warranted. 
Conducting cyber-centric operations in support of MISO may create a non-
resource intensive and cost effective environment that may facilitate operations on a 
much larger scale than traditional non-cyber centric MISO. As a real world example, 
cyber mastermind and current Russian Chief of Staff, General Gerasimov, believes 
wholeheartedly in persistent cyber engagements in support of MISO, “Long-distance, 
contactless actions against the enemy are becoming the main means of achieving combat 
and operational goals.”62 
7. Civil Affairs Operations 
The Department of Defense defines Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) as:  
actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that enhance 
awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the 
operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of 
instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional 
specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.63  
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USSOCOM’s incorporation of the cyber domain within the core activity CAO 
may present a possible opportunity to address this issue through the engagement strategy 
of addressing partner nation cyberspace vulnerabilities. Cyber enabled CAO could assess 
partner nation infrastructure for potential zero day vulnerabilities or conduct proxy cyber-
attack exercises to test the partner nation’s capability to conduct cyber defense. The 
combined exercises, executed under the “red team / blue team” methodology, could 
uncover underlying weakness that may potentially cripple a partner nation’s ability to 
provide its civilian core the essential civil services they need to survive. 
Viewed through a different light, cyber vulnerability reduction allows the partner 
nation the opportunity to address potential issues that may promote a violent extremist 
organization’s (VEO) ability to recruit or mobilize. Forbes, military author and cyber 
academic states, “Such expansion may include partnering with governments and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to ensure that global allies in defense and commerce 
can maintain the network architecture that facilitates daily social and governmental 
functions.”64 
E. CONCLUSION AND WAY AHEAD 
This chapter examined how USSOCOM could employ cyber operations in 
support of special operations. While analyzing the macro and micro levels of special 
operations, it showed that the application of cyber techniques, tactics, and procedures 
present a possible avenue to supplement, or in some cases replace, traditional special 
operations. Operations conducted from afar allow for greater risk management within the 
realm of manpower but may limit human domain capabilities. The next chapter examines 
whether USSOCOM can rely on USCYBERCOM for its cyber operations or if it needs to 
build an internal cyber capability in order to take full advantage of the possibilities 
offered by cyberspace for supporting special operations. 
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III. MEETING USSOCOM’S MISSION THROUGH 
CYBER OPERATIONS 
This chapter lays the foundation for how best USSOCOM can meet its mission 
requirements through the incorporation of cyber operations. The chapter first describes 
how the DOD organizes for cyber operations through USCYBERCOM and how 
USCYBERCOM serves USSOCOM. It then examines nine criteria to determine if 
USCYBERCOM’s support is sufficient or if USSOCOM should instead develop an 
internal cyber capability. Specific focus is applied to cyber mission, organization, U.S. 
Code Title authorities, budget, and relevance. The chapter concludes with an overall 
assessment.  
A. CURRENT U.S. CYBER ORGANIZATION 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, focusing on military cyberspace operations, 
ordered the creation of USCYBERCOM in 2009. The command was established not as a 
Combatant Command (COCOM) but as a subordinate command. USCYBERCOM is 
subordinate to the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM). USCYBERCOM 
combined multiple cyber and information military components within the DOD’s 
network security capability and unified them at the command’s Fort Meade 
headquarters.65 Secretary Gates further directed that the commander of USCYBERCOM 
would be the director of the National Security Agency (NSA).66 Although 
USCYBERCOM attained full operational capability (FOC) in 2010, it was not expected 
to reach its designated strength until the end of 2018.67 
The mission statement for USCYBERCOM states,  
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USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and conducts 
activities to: direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense 
information networks; and prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum 
military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure 
U.S./Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our 
adversaries.68  
In this role, USCYBERCOM is required to provide defense, both physical and 
logical, to the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN); provide cyber 
support to the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs); and provide, in time of need, 
cyber support to the USG.69 Figure 3 visually describes the USCYBERCOM mission as it 
relates to unit imperatives and enablers.  
 
Figure 3.  USCYBERCOM Mission.70 
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In his March 2015 thesis on cyber command structures, Tanner Leah noted that,  
USCYBERCOM is currently just over 6,000 billets (drawn from the 
services), while the services will by 2016 have nearly 43,000 total 
personnel (active duty service members, civilians, and contractors: Army: 
21,000, Air Force: 5,400, Navy: 15,300, Marines: 1,000) dedicated to 
cyber missions, such as DODIN operations and offensive and defensive 
cyber operations (DCO).71  
While unlikely to be as large as the Air Force at its founding, a cyber force would 
likely be larger than the roughly 43,000 personnel envisioned by the end 2016.72 ADM 
Stavridis, among others, has advocated for a standalone cyber force, independent and 
equal to the standing components of the,” Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.73 
USCYBERCOM is centered on three “focus areas: defending the DODIN, 
providing support to combatant commanders for execution of their missions around the 
world, and strengthening our nation’s ability to withstand and respond to cyber-
attacks.”74 USCYBERCOM created cyber mission forces with the sole purpose of 
addressing each focus area in detail. These forces are organized into three distinct types 
of teams corresponding to the three focus areas: Cyber Protection Forces (CPF), 
developed to protect the DODIN; Combat Mission Forces (CMF), assigned to GCCs for 
offensive and defensive cyber missions; and National Mission Forces (NMF), developed 
for defending critical national infrastructure. To populate the required force, 
USCYBERCOM is still formulating the proper design for the optimal team composition. 
They are in the process of defining the training requirements and essential qualifications 
to ensure they are meeting the GCCs’ operational needs. 
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By 2018, USCYBERCOM is expected to field 133 cyber teams in total.75 As of 
June 22, 2016, “the command’s deputy commander, Lt. Gen. James McLaughlin, told the 
House Armed Services Committee there are 46 teams at full operational capacity and 59 
at initial operational capacity leaving, 28 still to go.”76 Even after USCYBERCOM has 
filled all 133 teams, only 27 will be assigned to GCCs.77  
USCYBERCOM personnel assigned to the service cyber organizations are under 
the administrative control (ADCON) of each of the cyber components, while personnel 
assigned to USCYBERCOM fall under USCYBERCOM’s authority.78 However, 
USCYBERCOM retains operational control (OPCON) over all cyber personnel who 
reside within USCYBERCOM, no matter their originating component. USCYBERCOM 
provides Cyber Protection Teams to the GCCs; once assigned, the GCCs provide tactical 
control (TACON) over their employment. Figure 4 is a graphical representation of 
USCYBERCOM and its relationship to the GCCs and USSTRATCOM. Of note, because 
USCYBERCOM is not a unified command, USSTRATCOM interfaces with the GCCs 
on behalf of USCYBERCOM.  
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Figure 4.  USCYBERCOM Organizational Support Structure.79 
B. HOW USCYBERCOM CURRENTLY SERVES USSOCOM 
As of 2016, USSOCOM does not possess an internal cyber component and is 
reliant upon USCYBERCOM for almost all operational support. Though there has yet to 
be an official definition of what the cyber operational support will look like (size and 
capacity), as noted above USCYBERCOM is planning to field 133 cyber mission teams, 
27 of which will be allocated to the COCOMs.,8081 Although how these 27 teams will be 
allocated to the COCOMs is not definitive, given that there are seven GCCs, this is 
roughly four teams per GCC, assuming equal distribution. 
The future teams assigned to support USSOCOM may be divided along two lines 
of effort: 1) cyber mission forces for preemptive/unprovoked cyber operations, and 2) 
cyber protection forces for securing USSOCOM’s network. For the sake of argument, if 
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USSOCOM is assigned four cyber teams, one of which is dedicated to defending the 
network within USSOCOM, that leaves three teams to cover six Theater Special 
Operations Commands (TSOCs). Considering that in total, the TSOCs have operations in 
over 100 countries, which are also subdivided into multiple component special operations 
units, the cyber support from USCYBERCOM may be inadequate.82  
Of the undetermined cyber forces provided to USSOCOM, the researcher 
assumes they will serve in a dual-hatted role as they provide cyber support to 
USSOCOM, as a traditional unified command and uniquely support the TSOCs and their 
regionally focused special operations. The TSOCs may be at an advantage as a 
supporting command because they will be both supported by the COOCOM? and 
USSOCOM. Conversely, it is also possible the TSOCs do not receive cyber force 
augmentation as a GCC supporting command. Considering the precious nature and 
limited supply of cyber mission forces, the TSOCs should not conclude GCC cyber 
support is a guaranteed 
C. CYBER SUPPORT CRITERIA  
In order to assess USCYBERCOM’s cyber support to USSOCOM and whether 
USSOCOM would be better served by an internal cyber element, the researcher identified 
and analyzed nine criteria. These range from objective factors such as budgets and U.S. 
Code authorities to subjective elements such as culture and mindset. After discussing 
each of these, the chapter will give an overall assessment. 
1. Mindset and Culture 
The first criterion is mindset and culture. The reason mindset and culture was 
selected as an evaluation criterion is because USSOCOM’s cyber operations will require 
extensive expertise in the cultural nuances of a myriad of different operating 
environments.  
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Attribution of cyber operations to the country or organization of origin is of big 
concern when developing cyber weaponry. As an example, consider STUXNET. Initial 
speculation about who conducted the operation led to Israel, in part because of a word 
found in the code, “Myrtus.”83 Myrtus is the Hebrew translation of the English word 
Esther, and Esther is from the Old Testament (Torah). In order to prevent the attribution 
of sensitive cyber programs, USCYBERCOM will require linguistically and culturally 
knowledgeable cyber operators that know to avoid such disclosures.  
Culture is not only important externally to the organization, but also within. The 
internal culture or mindset of USSOCOM is equally as important to the mission. 
USSOCOM carries a unique culture that is built on trust, cohesion, unity, and 
understanding. A critical component of the USSOCOM internal culture stems from the 
highly selective nature of the unit. USSOCOM is staffed with some of the best Soldiers, 
Airmen, Marines, and Sailors the military has to offer. Cyber forces in support of 
USSOCOM will have to fit this requirement or they may be subject to marginalization. 
From the standpoint of the SOF cybertheorist Patrick Duggan, SOF specifically 
operates with a mindset that is capable of addressing “ambiguous associations between 
adversaries, computers, and data, while minimizing risks to force and mission.”84 The 
ability of SOF to operate with a minimal footprint while applying exact force applies to 
the entire gamut of human based warfare, including cyber war.85  
Duggan notes that “cyber SOF could tap into indigenous revolutions, resistance 
movements, and insurgencies, as well as harness the human factors of techno-social 
interaction, whether operating on the ground with them or while continents away.”86 
Cultural sensitivity is clearly critical for the success of these operations. Ultimately, cyber 
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SOF could employ the elements of Special Warfare to slowly change an adversary’s 
organization without ever physically entering it.  
Though USCYBERCOM may one day become capable of conducting these cyber 
SOF niche operations, without the immediate blending of organizational cultures between 
USCYBERCOM and USSOCOM, the operational gap may never be bridged. SOF-
established human networks are already standing worldwide and potentially capable of 
implementing cyber technologies. Without SOF intervention, many of the capabilities 
described in the preceding paragraph may never have the opportunity to materialize - 
especially in time-sensitive environments. 
Cyber operators have many similarities that run parallel to the culture ingrained 
into the special operations community. Similar to the SOF community, cyber operators 
will require regional, cultural, and language training.87 They will need to understand a 
cyber adversary’s dialect, work patterns, coding nuances, and methods of employment to 
fully understand the second and third order of cyber effects. As exemplified by 
STUXNET and the decoding of the worm, if the originator’s code contains information, 
i.e., cultural references or language, that is not particular to the region of employment, an 
objective of operating anonymously may not be met. 
With respect to the criteria of Mindset and Culture, USCYBERCOM, as currently 
structured, may not be able to meet the unique cultural needs of USSOCOM. If 
USCYBERCOM were to formalize a cultural and language training program and better 
mold its operators to the unique mindset of USSOCOM, they may be able to bridge this 
requirement gap. USCYBERCOM may one day mature to the point of including culture 
and language training similar to USSOCOM’s training model, but in the interim if 
USSOCOM requires a culturally astute cyber force, USSOCOM will be required to 
provide the training. 
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2. Operational Cyber Need 
Operational cyber need is a critical factor when determining the suitability of 
cyber support to USSOCOM. SOF are deployed in support of the GCCs in an atypical 
fashion, unique to each theater. The TSOC requirements in PACOM tend to vary from 
the TSOC requirements in CENTCOM. Furthermore, regional focus tends to shift based 
on guidance from USSOCOM’s Global Campaign Plan for Special Operations. The 
factors of operational cyber need may greatly influence the cyber footprint required for 
special operation’s missions. Cyber forces supporting USSOCOM will need the ability to 
dynamically re-task from each theater to support the global plan provided by 
USSOCOM. Cyber forces will also require the ability to surge as needed in support of 
specific national special objectives. 
As noted earlier, USCYBERCOM will field 27 Combat Mission Teams for 
distribution among all COCOMs. As of January 2014, USSOCOM was deployed to over 
100 countries and multiple SOF elements were supporting each country. Depending on 
the final cyber team size (currently estimated around 40–70)88 and scope of 
responsibility, USSOCOM will most likely require a robust cyber support element for 
each TSOC and several more at the command level. Without further analysis, it is 
difficult to say how many teams USSOCOM could effectively deploy, but this researcher 
estimates that USSOCOM could use at least 10 teams.  
If USCYBERCOM desires to bridge this operational gap, they would have to 
develop more cyber forces or shift priorities away from other COCOMs. The exact 
number of cyber forces requires further analysis on the behalf of USSOCOM and the 
TSOCs, but based on the sheer mission load, the current number of forces under the equal 
COCOM distribution model may not meet the operational requirement.  
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3. Cyber Warfare is Human Warfare 
The concept of human warfare is a critical criterion when evaluating 
USCYBERCOM’s cyber support to USSOCOM. To be sure, the cyber domain is human 
warfare no matter the operational environment, conventional or special operations, and 
therefore not specific to the requirements of USSOCOM. However, cyber warriors in 
support of USSOCOM will require the ability to mobilize as part of an asymmetric 
strategy against foreign adversaries. Duties may include airborne operations or 
clandestine infiltration into enemy occupied territory.  
The DOD has designated SOF as the premier force / subject matter experts for 
engagements in the human dimension. With this in mind, there appears to be a strong 
relationship to the inclusion of cyber and special operations. It is highly unlikely all that 
all cyber operations require SOF, but cyber operations that are politically sensitive in 
nature or require a high degree of human interaction are better suited for SOF. Of course, 
not all cyber operations are inherently sensitive to the political environment. For instance, 
if a conventional unit conducts a DA cyber-attack, as discussed in Chapter II, on a low 
level ISIS bomb maker, it is highly unlikely the effects will contain political 
ramifications.  
According to Duggan, “in spring 2014, Russia successfully demonstrated its new 
understanding of how to integrate (cyber) asymmetric technology into unconventional 
warfare (UW) operations by supporting paramilitary separatists in eastern Ukraine.”89 
Countries such as Iran and Russia successfully employ human based cyber-warfare 
through the pairing of SOF and Special Warfare. Iran and Syria have integrated a strategy 
to incorporate cyber-SOF and how to leverage this…potential within the asymmetric 
nature of conflict.”90 
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While understanding that the cyber domain is human-based warfare, no matter the 
operating environment, the unique human-based requirements created by USSOCOM 
may leave USCYBERCOM in an operational shortfall unless USCYBERCOM adds 
more human dimension-based capability into its USSOCOM specific cyber forces. 
USCYBERCOM may also need to add advanced capabilities into its force structure that 
allow cyber operators the opportunity to directly embed with SOF.  
4. Integration with USSOCOM Operations 
The integration of cyber forces into USSOCOM is critical because unity of 
command is a top priority for the USSOCOM commander. Relationships are important to 
USSOCOM, therefore cyber forces would have to maintain a habitual and lasting 
relationship with the command with little organizational bureaucracy. This cyber-support 
relationship would need to be responsive and dynamic, continually supporting the fluid 
nature of USSOCOM.  
Fitzgerald and Wright believe that USCYBERCOM is inefficiently organized to 
provide support to USSOCOM’s worldwide special operation requirements.91 They 
believe that while in a supporting role, USCYBERCOM’s preservation of cyber 
employees within the command prohibits USSOCOM from truly achieving unity of 
command.92 “For SOF cyber operations to be successful, it may require an in-house cyber 
component or organization that would ultimately serve as a full member of the 
USSOCOM command team, which is noticeably different from the current organization 
of a separate joint functional component at USCYBERCOM.”93 Because of this 
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USSOCOM may require a single, local cyber commander to ensure unity of effort across 
all GCCs.94 
With cyber forces allocated from USCYBERCOM to USSOCOM on a lease 
status, USSOCOM never achieves full operational control. This operational gap could be 
alleviated if USCYBERCOM were to provide a cyber command representative to 
USSOCOM as command to command liaison. Another option is for USCYBERCOM to 
provide forces to USSOCOM under an OPCON status.  
5. Need for Commanders within Reach 
Based on the current TSOC structure, the TSOCs will most likely require a cyber 
mission commander within the chain of command. In order to meet this criterion, 
USCYBERCOM will need to provide cyber forces to the TSOC in an OPCON role—
ultimately allowing the TSOC commander the opportunity to direct and control cyber 
forces within the command.  
If USSOCOM has to coordinate with a distant USCYBERCOM commander, this 
may be less effective than if USSOCOM has an internal cyber element. Technologies 
such as Adobe Connect, Tanberg, and Skype make worldwide interactions easier than 
ever, but nothing can replicate the value in face to face interactions, as demonstrated by 
the success of the technology networks of Silicon Valley.95 Anecdotally, most 
commanders are as interested in the supporting relationship of Operational Control 
(OPCON)—the capacity to physically direct and discipline a subordinate commander—
as they are with any of the official command relationships.96 An intra-SOF cyber 
command will have a higher kinship for the USSOCOM commander and be inclined to 
respond to that commander’s requirements foremost. If the cyber team or component 
commander to whom the GCC interacts with is neither a vested commander nor easily 
                                                 
94 Ibid. 
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35 
reachable, then the GCC will rely less on worthwhile cyber aptitudes and relapse to 
traditional means of waging war.97 
Of all people on the battlefield, the TSOC commander knows best where to 
employ special operations effects. The commander may not be the cyber subject matter 
expert, but he or she understands how to leverage a cyber warrior’s expertise to support, 
replace, or reinforce SOF capabilities. The commander has the best understanding of the 
structures and practices unique to SOF and their operations.98 SOF peculiar cyber teams 
would enjoy a communal conviction and mission empathy with their SOF comrades.99 
Considering this criterion, the operational, administrative, and tactical control of 
cyber missions is a critical concept when determining the benefit or failure of cyber 
forces, not only the TSOCs, but also USSOCOM writ large. In order to meet the criterion 
set forth, USCYBERCOM will need to provide the USSOCOM with full autonomous 
control of its assigned cyber forces. At this time, USCYBERCOM operates on an 
OPCON status, which greatly limits the TSOC commander’s directional power.  
6. Procurement Advantages 
The ever-changing operational environment in which SOF operate require a 
supporting cyber force that is capable of rapid procurement. Cyber forces in support of 
USSOCOM must possess the ability to assess operational environment quickly and 
develop technologies that best address the current threat. 
Building an intra-SOF cyber organization will give those cyber forces SOF-
unique procurement means for cyber capability generation, innovation, funding, and 
development. USSOCOM is the exclusive stakeholder for Major Force Program-11 
(MFP) funding. MFP-11 funding, separate from the traditional service component MFP-3 
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funding, allows the organization the opportunity to conduct rapid fielding and procure 
SOF peculiar equipment. If a cyber organization is housed within USSOCOM, it will 
retain the ability to procure service specific equipment under MFP-3 and SOF peculiar 
items under MFP-11. This allows the intra-SOF cyber command the ability to essentially 
leverage all forms of funding and field cyber related capabilities at nearly double the rate 
of MFP-3. 
USCYBERCOM may be unable to meet the rapid acquisition requirements as 
identified by USSOCOM. The hierarchical procurement nature of USCYBERCOM and 
MFP-3 funding prevents the command from rapidly meeting evolving SOF requirements. 
USCYBERCOM may be able to bridge this gap if they are granted rapid fielding 
authorities, such as included in MFP-11, but until then they are subjugated to longer 
capability development timelines.  
7. Control of Cyber Forces 
The current cyber structure is based on the premise that all cyber functions within 
the Department of Defense should be conducted and controlled by USCYBERCOM. 
Though the centralized control of cyber forces might make sense today, it may not fully 
take into account the future of warfare.  
Cyber operations, specifically, and more broadly the cyber domain, are among 
one of the most critical factors in combat. Maintaining and directing all cyber operational 
forces from USCYBERCOM appears to be conducive for the moment but has yet to be 
tested against an alternative. Alternative cyber force models include: decentralized forces, 
autonomous forces, interagency forces, or multi-national forces. These alternate forms 
may one day serve as attractive alternatives to the current USCYBERCOM model. 
Another area of analysis is the complex nature of cyber warfare and the difficulty 
of containing cyber effects on the intended target. An example of failing to oversee 
effects based operations is exemplified through IO (Information Operations) fratricide. 
This term is used to describe a situation in which one organization marginalizes an IO 
target while another bolsters it. The two efforts oppose each other and create an 
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unfavorable position for both organizations. USCYBERCOM’s one-stop cyber structure 
may create an environment that allows proper command and control over each 
cyberspace munition; ultimately preventing opposing efforts and ensuring unity of effort. 
The ability to vet, measure, contain and control cyber munition under one command 
greatly reduces the possibility of cyber fratricide. However, as the cyber fight continues 
to progress, the sheer volume of cyber-operations may become too much for one 
command to handle just as no single command handles all air operations.  
8. Title 10/50
Title 10/50 authorities are critical to conducting cyber operations. Cyber 
operations are sometimes referred to as inherently covert and therefore necessitate 
USCYBERCOM’s involvement under Title 50 authorities. This is not to say that all 
cyber operations must be covert, but USCYBERCOM is authorized to conduct such 
operations.  
Some believe that USCYBERCOM is an atypical organization that brings 
strength to the cyber world by the unique status of its commander and his double role as 
director of the National Security Agency (NSA). This strength comes in part from the 
juxtaposition of the Title 10 Traditional Military Activities (TMA) authorities of 
USCYBERCOM and the Title 50 intelligence collection authorities of the NSA. Having 
NSA and USCYBERCOM in the same location, with the same commander, provides the 
military with unique capabilities of both commands, and improves Title 10 in Title 50 
support to the geographical combatant commanders.100  
 In his article “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate,” Andru Wall notes 
“Title 10 is used colloquially to refer to DOD and military operations, while Title 50 
refers to intelligence agencies, intelligence activities, and covert action.”101 Although 
Title 50 is generally associated with the intelligence agencies, it is worth noting that the 
100 Andru E. Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, 
Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” Harvard National Security Journal 3, no. 1 (2011): 90–120. 
101 Ibid., 87. 
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Secretary of Defense maintains substantial powers within Title 50. Wall goes on to 
paraphrases Richard Gross, author of Different Worlds: Unacknowledged Special 
Operations and Covert Action by stating, “unacknowledged unconventional or cyber 
warfare may legally be conducted when directed by the President and Secretary of 
Defense in preparation for an anticipated conventional conflict, and those 
unacknowledged activities are excluded from the definition of covert action.”102 
The Title 10 / Tile 50 debate is an often cited as a reason why the military or 
USSOCOM for that matter should not conduct cyber operations, as the TMA clause in 
Title 10 does not authorize the conduct of covert operations, which falls under Title 50. 
However, the TMA clause does allow the military to conduct unacknowledged activities. 
These cyber operations are not classified ar4 covert action because they are bundled 
under the TMA clause.”103 
Although the TMA and Title 50 authorities nested under the SecDef look as if 
they afford the same value as the USCYBERCOM/NSA relationship, the proverbial 
intelligence/DOD community ‘rice bowls’ will continue to be guarded. Therefore, for the 
sake of time and bureaucracy, the dual-hatted nature of the USCYBERCOM commander 
will most likely be the preferred bridge between the two communities.  
9. Cost and Budget
The final criterion is cost and budget constraints. As the nation prepares to 
downsize the military, the DOD must remain good stewards of governmental funds and 
not incur unnecessary costs. Unnecessary costs described in the research are defined as 
the building of new cyber forces and/or procuring unbudgeted cyber equipment.  
In contrast to other domains of warfare producing a strategic effect in the cyber 
domain does not require a large convoluted budget, thousands of warfighters, tracts of 
land, or hefty gear reserves. Low investments and entrance into networks that are 
102 Ibid., 140. 
103 Andru E. Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, 
Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” Harvard National Security Journal 3, no. 1 (2011). 122. 
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available to the majority of the world’s population can offer entry into an adversary’s 
network. Unfortunately, as it stands, contrary to USSOCOM, USCYBERCOM as of 
2016 does not yet have its own budget to man, equip or train its own cyber forces and 
must ultimately rely on the services to fill this roll. If USCYBERCOM is elevated to a 
unified command status, this will no longer be an issue, but as is, USCYBERCOM is at a 
huge disadvantage. Therefore, even though the world of cyber warfare is cheap and easily 
accessed, the hierarchal nature of the Defense Department budgetary may prevent 
USCYBERCOM from quickly reacting to today’s modern battlefield.  
With the criterion in mind, the creation of new cyber forces or procurement of 
new cyber technologies may not be as difficult as they seem. Furthermore, it is also 
possible to assume the budgetary process for USCYBERCOM today may not model what 
the process will be in the future. President Elect Trump has identified cyber operations as 
one of his top five priorities. With this increased focus, it possible that certain budgetary 
procedures, specific to USCYBERCOM, could be streamlined for efficiency.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter identified and analyzed nine criteria for assessing whether 
USCYBERCOM’s support to USSOCOM is sufficient or if USSOCOM should establish 
an internal cyber element. Each criterion identified a series of positives and negatives that 
both support and refute the current USCYBERCOM support model. Although the results 
do not show one approach as being clearly superior to the other, their relative merits may 
become more apparent as USSOCOM gains experience in the cyber domain and 
USCYBERCOM matures. 
For this reason, the researcher recommends that USSOCOM continue to evaluate 
the current operational support structure provided by USCYBERCOM while further 
investigating options for future cyber-SOF development. To that end, the following 
chapter uses decision theory to evaluate different approaches for building a cyber element 
within USSOCOM. The decision theory analysis did not include the top-level question of 
whether USSOCOM’s cyber requirements is best met by USCYBERCOM or by a SOF-
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specific internal force, as that question was better addressed through the analysis of this 
chapter, which draws on different criteria.  
With regard to USCYBERCOM’s current operations, the researcher recommends 
they address two critical shortcomings. The first is language and cultural training. Similar 
to the Special Forces training pipeline, future cyber operators are prepared to support the 
COCOMs if they received theater specific training. Therefore, USCYBERCOM should, 
at a minimum, implement a language and region/theater specific coding program to 
address cultural nuances in cyber domain. 
 The second shortcoming is the procurement timeline. The MFP-3 procurement 
process takes too long and does not allow USCYBERCOM the ability to react quickly. If 
USCYBERCOM were to adopt USSOCOM’s procurement rapid acquisitions model, the 









IV. BUILDING USSOCOM’S CYBER CAPABILITY 
This chapter utilizes operational design and decision theory to analyze the 
potential creation of a SOF cyber capacity. The purpose of utilizing decision theory and 
operational design is twofold. For the military audience, operational design, as part of 
operational art, is the definitive military process for analyzing a problem set which 
ultimately allows the commander to make an informed decision. In contrast, decision 
theory is used more in the academic world. Decision theory gives a decision maker the 
opportunity to objectively analyze the information at hand and make a decision that is 
impartial to commander influence.  
A. DEFINING OPERATIONAL DESIGN 
The military’s process of operational design, though still evolving, is an iterative 
approach to defining an existing or forthcoming problem and then developing an initial 
strategy or plan to approach that problem. By understanding the task or problem, planners 
can shape the most appropriate output for the customer, or in the case of USSOCOM, the 
GCCs. A fundamental component of the operational design process is that the military 
planner must accurately and unmistakably understand the problem. The planner must 
comprehend how that problem presents an opportunity to the organization, and then 
provide the commander with all essential information so the best-informed decision can 
be made. 
Operational design requires an understanding of what capabilities an organization 
needs to achieve the end-state of the overall strategic plan. Operational design is 
fundamentally an examination of the ends, ways, means, and risk to overcome a problem. 
To be successful, operational design requires early identification of the problem’s center 
of gravity or multiple centers of gravity in the case of cyber and the different actors and 
operational environments involved. All of these elements come together in a 
comprehensive strategy, allowing the commander an opportunity to understand and grasp 
the gravity of the mission fully. The culmination of operational design leads the staff and 
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the commander into the Joint Operating Planning Process (JOPP), the next phase of 
operational art. 
When a military component undertakes operational design, it is critical to 
understand where the unit is in time and space, what the problem is, and where the unit 
wants to go. The time/space analysis is critical, as an organization cannot arrive at its 
desired destination if it is oblivious to its current whereabouts. The military component 
must analyze the external environment as well as the internal. The analysis should result 
in a thorough and well-defined problem statement that holistically identifies the problem. 
Finally, a unit requires a well-defined objective to properly address the unit’s 
(destination) end-state. Analyzing the three critical factors of where the unit is in time 
and space, what the problem is, and what the end state is, provides a foundation for 
formulating a plan to address the problem. Whether planning is facilitated through JOPPs 
(Joint Operational Planning Process) or further analysis of the problem statement 
warranted, there is little doubt that operational design plays a critical role in addressing a 
problem.  
With the operational design framework in mind, Chapter II described the 
operational environment and how cyber operations could be applied. The chapter 
provided the reader a snapshot of how USSOCOM could best implement cyber 
operations in accordance with 12 Core Activities. Chapter III furthered the time space 
analysis by assessing whether the cyber support provided by USCYBERCOM is 
adequate to meet USSOCOM’s operational requirement or if USSOCOM would be better 
served by having its own internal cyber capacity to meet its operational requirements. 
Because that analysis was inconclusive, the researcher recommends investigating how 
USSOCOM could build a cyber element while evaluating the current cyber-support 
structure through USCYBERCOM. The remainder of this chapter examines how 
USSOCOM could create its own cyber forces. 
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B. DESIRED END STATE 
The end-state for USSOCOM would be a fully operational, subordinate, cyber 
component command in direct support of USSOCOM. This is not to say 
USCYBERCOM will go away, but some cyber support to SOF will be organic to 
USSOCOM. This opportunity allows USSOCOM to ripen cyber warfighting as an 
essential segment of combatant command operations. Launching an intra-SOF cyber 
organization would consolidate cyber planning and execution within USSOCOM and 
give the SOF component commands a focal point to synchronize cyber activities. 
A potential organizational structure for USSOCOM that would incorporate the 
proposed cyber component command is shown in Figure 5. The cyber special operations 
command could function in an analogous fashion to the pre-established component 
commands under USSOCOM.  
 
Figure 5.  Potential Cyber Component Command 
The unit would most probably entail a commander in the rank of a general officer 
and a full staff to accomplish its mission of cyber special operations training, manning, 
equipping, and supporting cyber operational requirements from the TSOCs. The 
organization could assume responsibility for supporting all SOF cyber operations, 
including cyber defense, offense, and exploitation. SOF TSOCs might submit yearly 
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cyber requirements to USSOCOM. Then, based on mission priorities, USSOCOM could 
direct the SOF Cyber Commander to support the TSOCs as required, allowing the 
USSOCOM Commander to achieve the best organizational fit to support the GGCs. 
For the purpose of brevity, the cyber component command will be referred to the 
Joint Cyber Special Operations Command (JCSOC). Similar to the component 
commands currently nested within USSOCOM, the JCSOC can serve as a cyber support 
component for the Special Warfare and Surgical Strike missions. The unit would be 
fundamentally tasked with supporting USSOCOM’s core activities and providing cyber 
combat development and subject matter expertise to the headquarters. 
The JCSOC, as portrayed in Figure 6, could be divided along three central lines of 
effort. The first line, defined in name only as the Integration Branch, could liaise with 
interagency and civilian stakeholders to certify the organization is able to harmonize 
cyber operations within the whole of government approach. The second line of operation, 
Support to USSOCOM Headquarters, could deliver internal cyber protection to 
USSOCOM’s network and conduct cyber capability development in support of special 
operations. The third line of operation, the Deployable or Operational Component, could 
support the tactical employment of cyber operations in support of Surgical Strike and 
Special Warfare missions. 
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Figure 6.  Proposed Organization Structure 
C. DECISION THEORY ANALYSIS 
Decision theory is a mathematical approach for evaluating choices against 
different risks and goals. These choices can be represented as branches in a tree that 
illuminate different paths or courses of action that lead to different outcomes. Decision 
theory is a common methodology used both in industry and military organizations. It 
allows an organization the opportunity to visually map a decision and its subsequent 
sequels.  
As noted earlier, the research applied decision theory to the question of “how” to 
build a cyber capability in USSOCOM rather than “if” the capability should be pursued. 
The higher-level question was not included in the decision theory analysis as it employed 
different criteria that were best analyzed separately and not included in a decision tree.  
46 
A decision tree for analyzing different paths to developing a JCSOC with 
USSOCOM is shown in Figure 7.104 The boxes, labeled A through O, denote the 15 
junctures or decision points, while the lines, numbered 1 through 30, denote the branches. 
The colors of the boxes distinguish the junctures at different levels in the tree. The colors 
of the branches distinguish the preferred choices (green) from the less desirable ones 
(red). The decision criteria for evaluating each choice are based on four critical factors: 
USSOCOM commander acceptability, impact to core activities, funding/resources 
available, and time. For each of these four criteria, the two branches associated with a 
juncture are analyzed to determine which branch is preferred as shown in Figure 8. The 
preferred branch for the juncture as a whole is then taken to be the one that is preferred 
the most.  
                                                 
104 Note: The author decided to utilize use a decision tree to analyze the development of a cyber 
component command in lieu of whether to build the command because he believed it was more important 
to show how the component command would be built rather than arguing its existence. The rational for the 
command was explained in chapter III.  
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Figure 8.  Decision Tree Analysis: Decision Criteria vs. Decision Juncture 
The numbers shown in Figure 9 quantifiably represent the decisions made in the 
decision tree. Each preferred decision (green line) is assigned a value of +1, while each 
un-preferred decisions (red line) is assigned a value of -1. The values of +1 or -1 were 
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quantifying the total value of each decision. The far left column sums the total number of 
un-preferred decisions and preferred decisions for each end state, as indicated on the top 
row. The bottom row indicates the score for each end state, summing the second and third 
row’s values. This score is the sum of the non-preferred and preferred decisions along 
each path. For instance, the 5-year plan contains four non-preferred decisions and no 
preferred decisions, therefore receiving a score of -4. The ten year out scenario contains 
three non-preferred and one preferred, getting a score of a -2. 
The easiest course of action, highlighted in dark green, is to reorganize the 95th 
Civil Affairs Brigade, as the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological 
Operations Command (USACAPOC) or 1st Special Forces Command can easily fill the 
95ths current CAO mission. Additionally, Civil Affairs do not have any unique or critical 
skills specific to the branch. Though the author is a Civil Affairs Officer and understands 
the decision will most definitely cause heartache and concern, the unit’s tasks are easy to 
replicate. The author also assesses it may also be possible with the high level of Soldier 
competency in the 95th for CA Soldiers to retrain and fulfill the cyber requirement. With 
the reorganization of the 95th, nearly 2000 billets will become available for re-
designation—more than enough to meet the minimal 100-team SOF cyber operating 
requirements. 
Choosing to develop a new unit in five years, as highlighted in dark red (Column 
‘5 years out’), is the most difficult and the most resource intensive. It would be nearly 
impossible for the command to resubmit the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 
with the changes required to fill such a huge organizational change. To submit and fund 
the request, the process would most definitely require the Joint Chief of Staff’s approval 
and strict oversight. Otherwise, this course of action is impractical. 
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Figure 9.  Decision Tree Scoring (Preferred vs. Non-Preferred Decisions) 
1. Preferred Decision 
The first Juncture (A) in the tree requires that USSOCOM decide whether to build 
a new component command or reorganize under the current organizational structure. 
Keeping in mind the pre-established decision criteria (Commander Acceptability and 
Impact to Core Activities), the command best accepts this decision because they believe 
in the concept of better, not bigger.105 This decision is also supported because of the 
current DOD imposed fiscal restraints and future budget uncertainty. Finally, with the 
ever-progressing domain of cyber warfare, reorganizing would be the quickest method to 
building a SOF cyber capacity. Thus, branch 1 from juncture 8 is preferred according to 
all four criteria, as shown in Figure 8. The preferred course of action for this decision is 
to reorganize. 
                                                 
105 Ferdinando, Lisa, “Army Special Operations Command Evolves in Changing World,” 
Www.army.mil. January 27, 2015. Accessed September 13, 2016. 
https://www.army.mil/article/141746/Army_Special_Operations_Command_evolves_in_changing_world. 
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Assuming a decision to reorganize, the next decision Juncture (B) would be to 
determine whether this were best done by reassigning an equal portion of billets from 
each SOF component command to the new unit (branch 4) or designating one component 
to reorganize (branch 3). For this decision, the researcher believes USSOCOM would 
designate one unit to reorganize. The researcher believes that because of SOF component 
command budgets, it would be easier for one component to bear the entire responsibility. 
Additionally, some commands are much larger than others and have different demand 
signals. Requiring all commands to give up billets may not be the most conducive 
methodology for USSOCOM. However, it should be noted that branch 3, while preferred 
for three of the four criteria, was not preferred in terms of impact on core activities. 
Assuming USSOCOM chooses to reorganize an existing component, the next 
Juncture (D) requires selecting the component for reorganization. NAVSPECWARCOM 
(Naval Special Warfare Command) and AFSOC (Airforce Special Operations Command) 
were omitted from this decision because they both offer unique capabilities that could not 
be replicated in MARSOC (Marine Special Operations Command) or USASOC. 
Therefore, left with the decision between USASOC (branch 8) and MARSOC (branch 7), 
the command should choose USASOC. USASOC currently has the most billets of any 
special operations component command and its capabilities could be replicated in other 
commands or internally among its forces. MARSOC, in contrast, is too thin for 
reorganization and does not have the manpower or the experience at the staff level to 
handle such a large change. 
The final Juncture (I) along the reorganization path involves determining which 
unit within USASOC to reorganize. The decision is left between the 95th Civil Affairs 
Brigade, 8th Military Information Support Group or PSYOP (branch 17), or the fourth 
Battalions from each Special Forces Group (branch 18). The reason for considering only 
the fourth Battalions is that they have the most controversial and publicly contested 
mission (UW) in USASOC. Reflagging them would be politically palatable in congress. 
However, the researcher believes it is USSOCOM’s best interest to reorganize the 95h 
Civil Affairs Brigade’s billets. 95th is the only unit in USASOC that does not possess any 
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technical or non-replicable skills. In fact, prior to the establishment of an official civil 
affairs MOS (military occupational specialty), Civil Affairs Operations were conducted 
by Special Forces soldiers. This transition would also be the most cost-effective, as the 
95th does not have a large stockpile of mission specific equipment. The researcher 
estimates with the closure of the 95th, USASOC could reorganize rather efficiently to 
ensure the Special Forces Groups quickly assumed all CAO missions.  
2. Alternate Decisions 
The second-best decision is difficult to quantify because five alternate decision 
paths quantifiably fall in second place (Score 2). Two of these resulted from choosing to 
build a new unit, while three of the five resulted from reorganizing. Additionally, it is 
difficult to compare and contrast because junctures between sequels are not comparable. 
As an example, Juncture B - reflag one unit and equal harvest, cannot compare to 
Juncture C—reallocate current funding and request a new unit, because they are 
incomparable. At end state, the researcher cannot definitely say which course of action is 
second or third best, but the researcher does provide a potential outlook on what other 
courses of action may entail as weighted against the decision criteria.  
The first alternate decision is to build a new SOF cyber component command by 
reallocating current SOF funding and taking an unequal cut from each existing SOF 
component command based on TSOC mission requirements. This decision is one of the 
five-second best decisions and scored overall 3 positive decisions and 1 negative. With 
the exception of the first negative decision at Juncture A; Junctures C, F, and L were 
positive decision paths. In light of the reasoning for Juncture A, above in the section 
labeled Primary Decision, the researcher will address the rationale for the decisions made 
at Juncture’s C, F, and L. 
Juncture C determined that based on the four decision criteria, reallocating current 
funding for a new cyber unit would be the best decision. The USSOCOM commander 
would most likely accept this course of action because as stated earlier in the research, 
“new money” is a politically unpopular topic within the DOD but once the current budget 
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is appropriated, the command can then re-appropriate the funds as necessary. Concerning 
impact to core activities and time, if the command were to reallocate current funding, 
there may be a 5-year funding cycle negative impact to USSOCOM’s ability to conduct 
its traditional assigned responsibilities.  
Following Juncture C is Juncture F. At Juncture F, USSOCOM would need to 
decide when building the new cyber component command if it will require all 
components to reduce its budgets or enforce an unequal cut across the command. For this 
decision, the researcher believes USSOCOM would enforce an unequal cut based on the 
application of the decision criteria. From a commander’s perspective, it would be easier 
for General Thomas to direct all four subordinate component commands to reduce their 
budget rather than “going into the weeds” with one. Conversely, if USSOCOM were to 
direct an unequal cut, USSOCOM could preserve its ability to support its most critical 
core activities while marginalizing those that are not as important. An unequal cut also 
makes the most sense from a budgetary standpoint as not all SOF component commands 
have the same budget. USASOC tends to receive more budgetary support from the 
Department of the Army in comparison to MARSOC and the Department of Navy. 
Finally, concerning time, directing an equal cut among all components would take 
months if not years of negotiations with the SOF components and therefore not be 
conducive.  
D. CONCLUSION  
This thesis examined the supporting cyber relationship between USSOCOM and 
USCYBERCOM. It also analyzed USSOCOM’s two main missions, Special Warfare and 
Surgical Strike, in order to determine how cyber operations could support each mission 
and their core activities. By analyzing USCYBERCOM and its cyber support to 
USSOCOM, the thesis was able to address the main research question and two 
subordinate questions. 
The main question asks: is USSOCOM’s posture for cyber operations sufficient 
for the current and future operating environment? This research found it to be lacking for 
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both the current and future operating environment. USSOCOM requires further cyber 
capabilities as provided in the form of either an internal or external cyber organization 
(USCYBERCOM). The research is inconclusive as to which course of action is best, 
internal or external, but does provide a potential course of action if USSOCOM decides 
to develop an internal cyber command.  
Sub-question, one addresses whether or not the elements of USSOCOM’s core 
activities are sufficient as is or has room for improvement through the incorporation of 
cyber operations. Through the analysis of USSOCOM’s 12 core activities and potential 
incorporation of cyber warfare, there appears to be much room for improvement. Each of 
the 12 core activities could be greatly enhanced if cyber techniques, tactics, and 
procedures were applied.  
The final sub-question is whether USCYBERCOM’s cyber support arrangement 
meets USSOCOM’s requirement or if USSOCOM needs its own internal cyber force. 
The results here were inconclusive. If USSOCOM determines at some point the need for 
an internal cyber command, the researcher recommends that USSOCOM turn to the 
analysis of Chapter IV. Through the application of decision theory and operational 
design, the analysis suggests that the unit is best acquired by reorganizing USSOCOM’s 
existing combat components, in particular, by reflagging the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade of 
USASOC. The reflagging of the 95th seems to offer the best solution in terms of 
manpower, resources, and mission.  
If USSOCOM were to build a cyber unit in support of special operations, it would 
require in-depth planning and a multi-stakeholder approach. This approach would most 
likely require input from all levels of government. Interagency and civilian leaders alike 
must be included to ensure a potential unit considers all angles of cyber warfare.  
E. FUTURE WORK 
The cyber domain is constantly evolving and presenting new information and 
challenges every day. This constant change presents unique opportunities to both current 
and future researchers. Suggestions for future research questions include: 1) How 
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USCYBERCOM’s potential elevation to a unified command will affect USSOCOM’s 
operations. 2) If USSOCOM were to build a cyber component command, what would 
that command look like? 3) How best can USSOCOM incorporate cyber into its 
command without producing additional billets? 4) What would be the best mix of civilian 
and military cyber operators within USSOCOM? 5) What would it take budget-wise to 
build a component command in USSOCOM? Though the future work research list covers 
major ideas within the USSOCOM cyber debate, the list is not all-inclusive. If 
USSOCOM were to build a cyber component command, it would require a major 
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